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Everyday Diplomacy: UKUSA Intelligence
Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages
Jason Dittmer
Department of Geography, University College London
This article offers an alternative to civilizational thinking in geopolitics and international relations predicated
on assemblage theory. Building on literature in political geography and elsewhere about everyday practices that
produce state effects, this article theorizes the existence of transnational geopolitical assemblages that incorpo-
rate foreign policy apparatuses of multiple states. Everyday material and discursive circulations make up these
assemblages, serving as conduits of affect that produce an emergent agency. To demonstrate this claim, I out-
line a genealogy of the UKUSA alliance, an assemblage of intelligence communities in the United States,
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. I then trace the circulation of materialities and
affects—at the scales of individual subjects, technological systems of mediation, and transnational processes of
foreign policy formation. In doing so, I offer a bottom-up process of assemblage that produces the emergent phe-
nomena that proponents of civilizational thinking mistakenly attribute to macroscaled factors, such as culture.
Key Words: affect, Anglosphere, international relations, materiality, signals intelligence.
本文基于凑组理论，提出地缘政治与国际关係中，有关文明化思考的另类取径。本文以政治地理学及其
他领域中，有关生产国家效应的每日生活实践之文献为基础，对合併多国外交政策部署（apparatuses）的
跨国地缘政治凑组（assemblages）之存在，进行理论化工作。每日生活的物质与论述之循环，构成了这
些凑组，提供作为生产浮现中的行动者的情感导管。为了论证此一主张，我将概述英美联盟的系谱学——
一个由美国、英国、加拿大、澳大利亚与新西兰的知识社群所构成的凑组。我接着将追溯物质与情感，在
个人主体、中介技术系统，以及形成外交政策的跨国过程的尺度中之循环。我将以此提出由下而上的凑
组，该凑组生产了浮现中的现象，并被文明化思考的拥护者，错误地归因于诸如文化等钜型尺度之因
素。 关键词：情感，英语圈，国际关係，物质性，通信情报。
Este artıculo presenta una alternativa al pensamiento civilizador en geopolıtica y relaciones internacionales que
se predica en la teorıa del ensamble. Construyendo sobre la literatura de geografıa polıtica y de otros campos
acerca de las practicas cotidianas que producen efectos estatales, este artıculo teoriza la existencia de ensambles
geopolıticos transnacionales que incorporan los aparatos sobre polıtica exterior de multiples estados. El material
cotidiano y las circulaciones discursivas son los constituyentes de estos ensambles, sirviendo de conductos del
afecto que producen una agencia emergente. Para demostrar esta afirmacion, esquematizo una genealogıa de la
alianza UKUSA, un ensamble de comunidades de inteligencia en los Estados Unidos, el Reino Unido, Canada,
Australia y Nueva Zelanda. Trazo luego la circulacion de materialidades y afectos—a las escalas de sujetos indi-
viduales, sistemas tecnologicos de mediacion y procesos trasnacionales para la formacion de polıticas extranje-
ras. Al hacerlo, presento un proceso de ensamblaje de base a cima generador de los fenomenos emergentes que
los proponentes del pensamiento civilizador atribuyen equivocadamente a factores a escala macro, tales como
la cultura. Palabras clave: afecto, angloesfera, relaciones internacionales, materialidad, inteligencia de se~nales.
T
he Snowden leaks have captured the attention
of national publics and state elites all around
the world. The exposes—from the National
Security Agency (NSA) tapping of Angela Merkel’s
phone, to the Government Communications Head-
quarters’ (GCHQ) collection of sexually explicit web-
cam chats, to the mobile phone metadata handed over
to the U.S. government—have made mundane news
about what was, until recently, the mysterious world of
signals intelligence (SIGINT). Public debate, how-
ever, has focused on digital privacy rather than the
implications for our assumptions of how international
relations unfold. This article seizes this opportunity,
viewing the UKUSA intelligence partnership between
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the United States and United Kingdom (Canada, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand also participate) as an assem-
blage of circulating materialities and affects that
enable a collective agency to emerge alongside, but
incorporating, the state.
This collective agency is a ghostly presence in theo-
ries of international relations, which emphasize ratio-
nality in foreign policy formation while insufficiently
understanding the embodied and material contexts in
which policy is made and enacted (Vucetic 2011).
Crucially, these material relations not only enable pol-
icy to be carried out but also serve as affective conduits
shaping subsequent foreign policy formation. In short,
the collective agency emergent from intelligence
cooperation ensures not only that participating gov-
ernments can do more in the international realm (a
pooling of resources) but also that they are affected by
events rippling through the wider transnational assem-
blage. The foreign policy apparatuses of the UKUSA
states do not make rational decisions on the basis of
their national interest; rather, the cognitive sense-
making of their interests is shaped through participa-
tion in UKUSA. This transnational assemblage of
bodies, satellites, computers, cables, drones, micro-
wave transmitters, undercover agents, and so on is a
kind of everyday diplomacy that, in conjunction with
other discursive and material connections between
foreign policy apparatuses, enables emergent agencies
to reshape global politics. These emergent agencies
have been largely imperceptible because of the embed-
ded statism (Taylor 1996) of our own geopolitical
sensibilities.
In the literature review, I begin by highlighting
several attempts by international relations scholars
to engage in civilizational thinking. These have
been attempts to pin down the ghost in state-centric
theories of international relations; namely, that a
range of collective agencies above the state are con-
stantly emerging and can be felt, like a poltergeist,
providing a nudge that is empirically felt. In con-
trast, I highlight recent literature in political geogra-
phy, political science, and political theory
emphasizing the role of everyday practices in pro-
ducing state effects. I advance this literature by
emphasizing the everyday diplomacies and circula-
tions that mangle (Pickering 1995) together state
foreign policy apparatuses into these collective agen-
cies, often mistaken for civilizations. A consider-
ation of how these assemblages form and how they
act back on participating governments is juxtaposed
with the literature on intelligence cooperation,
identifying an institutionalist bias in the latter that
this article seeks to correct.
Following a brief discussion of methodology, the
article turns to an historical account of the UKUSA
assemblage, first tracing its genealogy and then docu-
menting the ways in which circulating materialities
and affects—at the scales of individual subjects, tech-
nological systems of mediation, and finally transna-
tional processes of foreign policy formation—produce
a collective agency that can be discerned. The article
concludes with two points. First, the literature on
intelligence cooperation can productively take up
assemblage thought to problematize the institutions,
policies, and decisions that serve as the basis for most
studies in that field. Second, although critical geopoli-
tics has effectively deconstructed civilizational dis-
courses, it generally has not attempted to construct an
alternative account. Therefore, research is needed to
trace the impact of everyday diplomacies, to be atten-
tive to the role of materiality and affect in producing
our geopolitical world.
Literature Review
Civilizational Thinking and Macroinfluences
on International Affairs
Civilizational thinking has a long pedigree, both in
international relations and in wider academic thought.
Jackson (1999), reviewing the resurgence of civiliza-
tional thinking in international relations (e.g., Gress
1998), noted the heterogeneity of these approaches:
“Some authors prefer to talk about the impact of civili-
zational loyalties on the foreign policies of states,
while others concentrate on how the values and prac-
tices of a given civilization impact economic growth
and personal liberty” (142). Some authors asserted an
ontological realism to civilizations, whereas others see
them as the outcome of social processes (and, there-
fore, the result of stable, if fluid, relations).
If theorizing the West as a civilization gained
renewed salience during the Cold War (Neumann
1996), its awkward fusion with Huntington’s (1996)
global civilizational schema received an invigorating
jolt from the events of 11 September 2001. Although
the West remains a relevant geopolitical discourse,
Huntington’s theory has fallen out of favor with West-
ern elites, as it was alienating to potential allies. Tak-
ing its place is another civilizational construct: the
Anglosphere.
UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages 605
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Pointing both to past race-based nomenclature
such as the white dominions and the Anglo-Saxon
world as well as to post–World War II attempts to
maintain cooperation between the United States
and the British Empire (see Hugill [1993] on the
unity of the Anglo-American empires), the term
nevertheless has cropped up in more recent times.
Recent proponents such as Anglo-American histo-
rian Robert Conquest (1999) and U.S. businessman
and consultant James C. Bennett (2004) attribute
this revival to the network ontology of the Inter-
net, which has intensified the connections among
English-speaking countries and also among English-
speaking communities in otherwise non-Anglo-
phone states. Nevertheless, it is the Anglo-Ameri-
can “special relationship” that serves as the key
historical and contemporary axis. According to
Megoran (2010):
[Bennett] imbues his putative Anglosphere with a messi-
anic political mission. If the nineteenth century was a
“British Century” that abolished slavery, and the twenti-
eth an “American Century” that ended totalitarianism,
then the twenty-first may be the “Anglosphere century”
that can abolish ‘‘singularity”, or the habit that states
have of acting alone. (188)
It is in this mode—thinking singularity—that the
Anglosphere has been taken up by international rela-
tions scholars. Vucetic (2010, 28) conducted statistical
analysis of U.S.-led interventions (1950–2001) and
found that “when push comes to shove, the English-
speaking peoples tend to flock together.” Culture is
here the unseen apparition explaining the motion on
the geopolitical Ouija board.
Civilization and culture are thus a theoretical strat-
egy to buttress an ontology of singularity against one
of fragmentation and relationality. In the next sec-
tion, I argue that attempts to understand these mac-
roscaled phenomena instead need to focus on the
small, the micro, and the baroque to understand their
emergence.
Assemblage and Transnational Bodies Politic
Over the past decade, political geography has gener-
ally abandoned its fixation on the state in favor of a
focus on everyday practices, in part a response to
criticisms coming from feminist and popular geopoli-
tics (Dowler and Sharp 2001; Hyndman 2004; Dittmer
and Dodds 2008). This move to defy this historical
(and often imperialist) preoccupation with the state
has produced many insights into how the local, the
national, and the global are entwined in ways unpre-
dictable if one looks only at macroscaled phenomena
(e.g., Pain and Smith 2008; Kuus 2010; Harker 2011).
The crucial role of microscaled practices in the
production of “larger” entities has been used to
rethink our theorizations of the state (Mitchell 1991;
Painter 2006). This opens up the state–nonstate
binary in multiple dimensions, such as the divide
between official elements of the state assemblage
(e.g., government ministers, passports, or judges) and
the private elements that are nevertheless crucial to
the performance of state-ness (e.g., voters, taxpayers,
and civics textbooks) or the divide between legiti-
mate states and other polities exhibiting state-like
qualities (McConnell 2009; Jeffrey 2013).
Historically the nation-state has often been prob-
lematically considered as a body politic, but Protevi
(2009) reappropriated the term to refer to assemblages
of embodied subjects and the material objects that
empower them. Human bodies are affected by partici-
pation in these assemblages; this background hum of
flux and flow shapes the way we develop over a life-
time. Bodies politic can range from short-lived
assemblages such as a phone conversation to more
institutionalized assemblages such as a state. Bodies
politic are, by virtue of their openness to the world,
constantly buffeted by affects that generally work to
habituate political behavior but also potentially shock
those systems into new patterns of action (DeLanda
2006).
Protevi (2009) schematized this concept by differ-
entiating between first- and second-order bodies poli-
tic. First-order bodies politic are individual human
subjects. Through this category, Protevi theorized our
embodied cognitive sense-making, from how we per-
ceive social categories like race and gender to how var-
ious material flows (food, media, etc.) impact our
embodied political responses. Second-order bodies pol-
itic entail an assemblage of people engaged in collec-
tive affective cognition. Bodies politic cannot be
understood chronologically (individuals first, who
then compose groups—as in social contract theory).
Rather, first- and second-order bodies politic are
engaged in synchronic emergence; they are all becoming
together.
Bodies politic enable us to consider politics as
occurring across a range of sites and over multiple
temporalities (Dittmer 2014; Squire 2015). Whereas
traditional diplomatic relations and their institu-
tionalization in international organizations are
606 Dittmer
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an obvious and well-studied form of assemblage
(Armstrong 1998), I wish to highlight a different
type of relation between state apparatuses: one
focused on everyday diplomacies that tie states
together in a more intensive way.
Barry (2001, 11) foregrounded the “centrality of
photography, television, and satellite surveillance
technologies in the conduct of international
relations.” These technologies are conduits for affec-
tive circulation. For example, the White House Situ-
ation Room is a famous example of a networked site
defined by its technological ability to tap into affects
from faraway places. These affects shape the political
cognition of not only the president but also his staff,
albeit refracted through their differentiated bodies
(Colls 2012). Consequently, the political cognition
of a second-order body politic (the United States) is
also affected. This is because affects are embodied but
also more than that; they are not reducible to the
subsequent ways that they make humans “feel.”
Affects circulate within entirely nonhuman systems,
which can produce self-organizing systems on their
own. Affect is the force inherent to a specific rela-
tion, which transforms properties into capabilities.
Therefore, it is not just people who are affected and
affecting but also things, institutions, and more dif-
fuse assemblages as well. This interface between the
human and nonhuman elements of an assemblage
requires close attention to the technical.
Barry (2001) argued that the connectivity of inter-
national relations relies on a harmonization of the
technical practices of governmentality. In traditional
diplomacy, this harmonization is known as protocol,
but the concept can be carried into everyday diploma-
cies as well. This might be theorized, following Pro-
tevi, as the inculcation of embodied bureaucratic (and
other) habits that can be applied anywhere within the
larger diplomatic assemblage (Kuus 2013). Equally,
they might be material forms that enable disparate
state apparatuses to connect—the equivalent of a
power adapter for tourists who want to charge their
phone.
Thus far, bodies politic have been discussed in
rather teleological fashion, as if these everyday diplo-
macies were inevitable results of self-organization.
Although all systems have the potential for change
immanent within them, it need not occur. Humans in
particular, although composed as political subjects
through processes of assemblage, are unique in that
they have a degree of reflexivity and can rework their
bodies politic through techniques of the self (Connolly
2002). This raises a traditional concern of interna-
tional relations—that of political and economic inter-
ests and their role in structuring outcomes. Following
McFarlane (2011), I argue that the national interest is
always multiple and contradictory, produced through a
series of materialized transnational assemblages
(embassies, nongovernmental organizations, think
tanks, media networks, lobbying groups, etc.) that
interact with one another and hold stable—for a
time—a confused consensus (see Woodward 2014).
Indeed, the national interest is nowhere near as stable
as the physical geography some see as its origin
(Kaplan 2012). As McFarlane (2011) puts it, assem-
blage thought
seeks to describe the labour through which relations are
held together and how novelty emerges through interac-
tions, and aims to identify the potential for those rela-
tions to be otherwise. Political economies and structures
emerge as relational products assembled through multi-
ple routes, actors, histories, contingencies, resources,
socio-materialities and power relations. (378–79)
The creation of bodies politic, and their subsequent
affects and effects, are not determined by structuring
forces such as political economy or geography (either
physical or cultural). They are highly contingent, with
general patterns emerging that are subject to nonlinear
change.
Intelligence Cooperation
The literature in geography has rarely touched on
intelligence matters. Several papers have examined
the historical role of the discipline in intelligence
work, or vice versa (Heffernan 1996, 2000; Clout and
Gosme 2003; Crampton, Roberts, and Poorthuis
2014). The work of Barnes (2006) is particularly
salient given his deployment of actor-network theory.
Still, all are concerned with stand-alone intelligence,
rather than intelligence cooperation.
The literature on cooperation from the field of
intelligence studies can be characterized as falling
into three broad categories. The first category, and
perhaps the most crucial, is fundamentally descriptive
in nature. These studies are crucial because of the
secretive subject matter; in this more than most
fields, the object of study is explicitly in a black box
beyond reach. Therefore, basic facts must be pieced
together through examination of archives and leaked
documents, often in collaborative fashion, prior to
any kind of deeper analysis. Works in this vein
UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages 607
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examine intelligence cooperation as part of the
broader UK–U.S. “special relationship” (Dumbrell
2009; Wallace and Phillips 2009) or trace the institu-
tional histories of the Canadian (Rudner 2001) or
Australian (Andrew 1989) SIGINT agencies, which
are inextricably linked to UKUSA cooperation. Per-
haps most impressive in describing these agencies is
Richelson and Ball (1990), which details each of the
UKUSA agencies in intricate—but totally atheoreti-
cal—detail.
The second category is work that frames intelli-
gence cooperation through rational choice theory
(often implicitly). The term defining this literature is
quid pro quo, a term used by practitioners to describe
the framing of intelligence cooperation through a
bartering of information (Sims 2006). At the more
descriptive end of this literature is Westerfield
(1996), who argued that the United States exchanges
SIGINT for locally nuanced, difficult to obtain
human intelligence. Lefebvre (2003) and Rudner
(2004) each analyzed tensions in intelligence cooper-
ation resulting from geopolitical dynamics. Clough
(2004) provided a complex analysis offering several
models of collaboration, varying in several dimen-
sions. These works all conceptualize intelligence liai-
son as a rational exchange of information in which
everyone is better for the exchange but with future
exchange contingent on it remaining in the national
interest.
A few works move past rational choice theory to
consider how intelligence cooperation fits with the
various theories dominant in international relations
or liberal political philosophy (Aldrich 2004; Svend-
sen 2008; Munton 2009). This is the smallest cate-
gory, although it must be said that the fuzzy border
between rational choice theory and international
relations realism makes classification of these works
ambiguous.
This literature was critiqued by Gaddis (1989) as
disconnected from wider scholarship. Aldrich (2002,
138) argues that “even ten years later, few could argue
with [Gaddis’s] observation that some of the work in
the area of intelligence studies is the equivalent of
‘military buffism’—a kind of secret service train-
spotting.” This distresses me less than the institu-
tionalist assumptions at the heart of the literature; it is
assumed that intelligence agencies are rational actors
and are able to make decisions about collaboration
that are then subject to analysis.
The theoretical orientation of this article is quite
different than this literature, in that it focuses not on
institutions but on their internal and external rela-
tions. Barry (2001, 46) noted that “[d]uring the cold
war, the absence of connections between Nato and
the Warsaw Pact created the conditions within which
an enormous level of anxiety could develop around
the imagined technological superiority of one or the
other.” By highlighting the power of (dis)connection
to generate and circulate embodied affects, Barry
highlighted the role of Protevi’s affective sense-mak-
ing in the Cold War context, demonstrating the syn-
chronic emergence of first- and second-order bodies
politic. As Ahmed (2004, 128) put it, “It is the very
failure of affect to be located in a subject or object that
allows it to generate the surfaces of collective bodies.”
The Cold War divide between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact was not absolute; indeed, the Cold War
itself must be understood as a body politic of a sort.
One role performed by the intelligence services during
the Cold War was to provide a relation between the
two sides: “Both sides were offered some reassurance
against the possibility that its enemies were planning a
surprise attack. . . . Collectively, these operations
calmed everyone’s fears, and their most substantial
benefits might be measured through greater stability
and the perpetuation of an uneasy peace” (Aldrich
2010, 175). So although NATO and the Warsaw Pact
can each be understood as a higher order body politic,
linked together through the materialization of many
relations (including intelligence cooperation), they
were equally hitched together through other relations
(including spying on one another).
Methodology
This research is primarily based on archival research
in the National Archives of the United Kingdom and
the National Security Archive at George Washington
University, as well as documents made available by the
National Security Agency. The 2010 declassification
of documents on both sides of the Atlantic acknowl-
edged the UKUSA alliance, although secondary litera-
ture (some speculative, some well-informed) has been
available since the late 1980s. Review of these primary
and secondary sources has been combined with inter-
views with retired senior intelligence officials from the
United Kingdom and United States. These present-day
interviews, combined with an examination of docu-
ments leaked in the Snowden affair, provide insight
into the evolution of the UKUSA alliance beyond the
horizon of declassification.
608 Dittmer
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The Evolution of UKUSA
Antecedents and Institutionalization
The identification of a singular starting point for an
assemblage is impossible; rather, the emergence of its
collective agency is the result of a range of processes,
taking place at different temporalities. For UKUSA,
one such process can be dated to 5 September 1940,
when the British government suggested that collabora-
tion pick up where it had left off following World War
I (Aldrich 2010), proposing an exchange of full infor-
mation on German, Italian, and Japanese code and
cryptographic information (Early papers n.d.). They
further proposed a continuous exchange of radio inter-
cepts. At this point the United States agreed to the
former but rejected the latter; it is notable that this
collaboration predates the U.S. entry to the war. An
agreement to exchange diplomatic traffic would wait
until well after Pearl Harbor (15 January 1943).
UKUSA can also be seen to emerge from the bot-
tom-up process of collaboration in the field. It is here,
if anywhere, that the common language contributes to
the emergence of UKUSA—not as a macroscaled cul-
tural force but as an affective predisposition to com-
munication. British and U.S. forces in the field often
shared intelligence when beneficial. Initial resistance
by the U.S. Navy to the governmental negotiations
came not because they did not want to collaborate but
because they preferred the less formal status quo:
While in effect we actually collaborate on all technical
matters, we are not bound by any agreement to do so.
For example, although we have agreed to supply all
recoveries we have not promised to supply our methods
in making recoveries. (An agreement 1943, 2)
Similarly, the Office of Strategic Services (forerun-
ner to the CIA) had regular liaison with British intelli-
gence in Southeast Asia for the entire duration of the
war (George 1946). Of course, neither top-down nor
bottom-up collaboration would have occurred without
the war, and the end of the war could just as easily
have led to the dissolution of the assemblage as it did
in World War I.
Two factors set in train the UKUSA agreement.
First, growing concern over Soviet behavior in the
war’s endgame sparked suspicion in both London
and Washington. Even before the war was over,
Anglo-American TICOM (target intelligence)
squads of intelligence analysts were dispatched to
“liberate” German encryption equipment and cryp-
tographers to contribute to the new SIGINT target:
the Soviet Union (Aldrich 2010). A similar effort
was undertaken in the Pacific, although in this case
Britain and the United States each recovered mate-
rial from their newly (re)occupied territories and
then shared the results (Minutes of the sixteenth
meeting 1945).
Atomic weapons heralded a new geopolitics that
could not be extrapolated from past models. SIGINT
offered a chance to anticipate future emergencies and
preempt them (Adey and Anderson 2012), as stipu-
lated in this 1 September 1945 memo to the Secretar-
ies of State, War, and the Navy:
In view of the disturbed condition of the world and the
necessity for keeping informed of the technological
developments and possible hostile intentions of foreign
nations, it is recommended that the United States take
advantage of unique British sources of information by
continuing the full exchange of technical data and intel-
ligence. (Marshall and King 1945, 2)
This postwar collaborative work on Soviet codes,
originally known by the code word RATTAN and
then as BOURBON, was an affect-informed
response to a new element of the assemblage: the
circulating multiplicitous forms of the atomic bomb
(images of mushroom clouds, accounts of the after-
math in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, strategic planning
reports, etc.).
A second factor was the technological geographies
of radio and encryption used in the late 1940s (Pinker-
ton and Dodds 2009). The geography of the postwar
British Empire and the new global presence of the
United States made for a natural partnering (Denfeld
1947); where the United States had few listening sta-
tions, the British had many, and vice versa. This geo-
graphic fact only gains salience in conjunction with
the techniques of decryption used at the time, for as
important as the topography of empire is the topology
of communications technology: “British intercept sta-
tions are more favorably located than ours to copy cer-
tain RATTAN traffic. In addition, RATTAN traffic
passed on British-owned cables would be available”
(Wenger 1945a, 1). Decryption is a “volume” business,
requiring as many intercepts as possible. The intersec-
tion of a nuclear future with both the prewar telegram
cable network (centered on London; see Keefe 2006)
and the routine processes of decryption, incentivized
UKUSA collaboration.
There was resistance to UKUSA as it was formal-
ized, often based in uncertainty of the future. One
uncertainty was in future capabilities:
UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages 609
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In the latter part of the war we have had to share consid-
erably more than our share of the load. . . . Unless a
proper bargain is struck with the British, it is probable
that this state of affairs will persist and we shall find our-
selves at the short end of things. (Wenger 1945a, 2)
Whereas this line of flight envisioned a more prag-
matic, barter-based system in the future, another imag-
ined an entirely different postwar order:
[W]e will find ourselves disadvantageously placed if we
have to support GREAT BRITAIN always vis-a-vis
RUSSIA. I feel the technical advantages gained by this
collaboration are entirely insufficient to warrant any pos-
sible hamstringing of our proper position in the interna-
tional structure. (Cooke 1945, 1)
This future, almost impossible to envision today, nev-
ertheless recognizes how intelligence cooperation
would mangle U.S. and British foreign policy.
Other futures were envisioned and eventually
actualized. One was influential in the UKUSA
agreement: budget cuts. One naval officer wrote, “I
feel that not long after the peace, [the British] will
outstrip us in communications intelligence—not in
what we might do, but rather in what we shall be
allowed to do” (Thebaud 1945, 1). And so, moti-
vated by imminent cuts on both sides of the Atlan-
tic, representatives of GC&CS (the earlier name of
GCHQ) met with representatives of the U.S. intel-
ligence community, beginning in October 1945, to
negotiate. The framework agreement was dated 5
March 1946, and a subsequent set of UK–U.S.
technical conferences produced, and updated, the
appendices to the agreement in which the specific
procedures of intelligence collaboration were set
out. I now turn to the scale of mundane procedures
and everyday life to show how affects circulated
within the everyday diplomacy of UKUSA, produc-
ing an emergent agency.
Bodies Politic, Liaisons, and Affect
UKUSA can be thought of as a mangling together
of two (or five, if the dominions are included) second-
order bodies politic (the U.S. and UK intelligence
communities). Each has within it several other sec-
ond-order bodies politic (originally, GC&CS, Op-20-
G [U.S. Naval intelligence], the Army Security
Agency, etc.). All of these second-order bodies politic
are composed of first-order bodies politic (individual
people) and the technologies that enable them to
operate. At the scale of these individuals, the man-
gling together of these assemblages meant the harmo-
nization of security procedures, terminology, and other
everyday materialities of the state: the physical forms
of intercepted raw traffic, the translation of intercepts,
the brand of equipment (IBM), the style of analytic
reports, the method of encryption, and so on. These
common materialities enabled wider circulation of
affects across the Atlantic.
The first appendix to the initial UKUSA agreement
spells out the code words to be used for various forms
of intelligence, along with their security procedures.
Decrypted intelligence was designated by the term
CREAM, and traffic intelligence (i.e., anything that
can be learned from a still-encrypted message) was
termed IVORY. This stratification of intelligence car-
ried with it a stratification of its material and spatial
forms; CREAM was top secret and IVORY was merely
secret (raw intelligence was classified as confidential).
CREAM could therefore only be transported unen-
crypted if “sealed and via officer courier or other
trusted routes, . . . or by protected in-house local com-
munications systems, or by external landlines only as
specifically approved” (Appendix A 1946, 7). IVORY
could be transported via the same routes or by regis-
tered mail. Neither CREAM nor IVORY could be
“conveyed by aircraft or land transport over territory
controlled by other than the United States or British
governments” (Appendix A 1946, 40–41).
A further stratification was directed at intelligence
officers. Both parties were required to have as few peo-
ple as possible indoctrinated (sworn) into the coopera-
tion. Those not indoctrinated could not even know
the terms CREAM and IVORY existed. This require-
ment led to stratification of spaces: “due precautions
shall be taken (by providing segregated, secure areas or
otherwise) to ensure that the activities and knowledge
of such persons are confined to the COMINT [a syno-
nym for SIGINT] material and activities to which
they have access” (Appendix B 1953, 7).
Beyond the microgeographies of the office, a further
stratification reworked not only space but time: “Every
effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has
a knowledge of current value about COMINT, such
that his capture or interrogation could be a substantial
risk to the security of COMINT, shall be assigned to
or engage in activities of a hazardous nature” (Appen-
dix B 1953, 8). In practice, this meant that staff was
categorized into four groups. Group A did not know
there were groups. Their mobility was unrestricted.
Group B knew about IVORY (the terms had changed
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by then, but the categories remained), and Category C
was indoctrinated to CREAM. The former could be
assigned to hazardous duties after six months’ separa-
tion from intelligence material, whereas the latter
required a year’s absence. Category D had “precise
knowledge of COMINT processing techniques, com-
petence, or potential” and could never be assigned to
hazardous duties (Appendix B 1953, 9). Given the
link between hazardous duties and particular spaces,
these procedures created a set of striated spaces of dif-
ferential access, with the intelligence sticking to the
bodies of the indoctrinated for various lengths of time
(or permanently).
Even as UKUSA was productive of new hierarchi-
cal spatialities and temporalities, it attempted to pro-
duce a smooth space of flows between intelligence
centers. For instance, within UKUSA “foreign
communications” were defined as those of “a faction,
group or nation that is not a party to this agreement”
(Enclosure A 1945, 6). In defining it so, a domestic
space was constructed that included both the United
States and the British Empire. Indeed, Lander (2004)
noted that one reason for UKUSA’s success is that
consumers of intelligence do not know from which
country it originated. Crucial to such domesticated
space is the role of trust as an affective relation
between bodies. A significant amount of trust was built
up between British and Americans at all levels of the
war effort. Often this circulation of trust became
“stuck” in particular, crucial bodies. For instance,
while considering the British offer of collaboration,
one U.S. Army officer said this of British Foreign Sec-
retary Bevin (Communications intelligence 1946, 1):
“he had debated vigorously and sometimes harshly
before entering into [agreements], but having once
committed himself he would carry out his contracts to
the full.” Trust could not depend on such individuals
for long, and UKUSA procedures were used to main-
tain this transnational intimacy through the organiza-
tion of space (Thrift and Leyshon 1994).
The wartime practice of secondment was institu-
tionalized, such that “[e]ach party is authorized, with
the consent of the other, to send personnel to work
with the personnel of the other part on any task allo-
cated to such other party or for which it may be
responsible” (Appendix, 5 February 1946, 6). This is
true also of today’s UKUSA. One retired senior UK
official explained, “There is a massive exchange of
people coming back and forth all the time for talks. . . .
The key players will all know each other, from the
mid-career on up.” Another retired senior UK official
noted that once or twice a year the NSA and GCHQ
managerial boards hold a conference. There are also
frequent specialist conferences: “cryptographers hold-
ing conferences about elliptic curves or other mysteri-
ous things which I never understood.” The procedure
was never that secrets were disallowed, in fact secrets
were explicitly allowed; rather, it was that the other
side should know via their proximity that secrets were
being kept. This discouraged secrets because both sides
knew trust was crucial. Further, having people in close
proximity helped to form bonds of friendship that
helped an affective reservoir of trust to form over time.
A retired U.S. official described this:
Friendship requires having a reserve; “you know you can
trust me because I haven’t done this to you before this.”
With the Commonwealth it just makes it easy, it’s com-
fortable and you know you can trust one another even
though you recognize you work for another country.
The microgeographies of common labor thus contrib-
uted to the emergence of second-order bodies politic
in which some individuals play a key role: liaisons.
Appendix G of the original agreement allows for
the establishment of “senior liaisons” (Appendix G
1946, 1). Beyond this ambassadorial figure, other liai-
sons can be accredited to specific agencies or working
groups as necessary. Liaisons “shall normally have
unrestricted access to those parts of the other’s operat-
ing agencies which are engaged directly in the produc-
tion of Communication Intelligence” (Appendix G
1946, 1–2). Policing the transparency of the other
party is not their primary job; the senior liaison is
meant to be the conduit for requests for specific
information.
Liaisons remain central to mediating diplomatic
intercepts and human intelligence. The relations
between opposite numbers deepen over a multidecade
career; one retired UK senior intelligence official
described it as a process of “growing up together,” with
a relationship often beginning in a far-flung outpost
and continuing as both parties rise in their respective
organizations: “In the SIGINT world you have life-
long friendships that extend into families, into holi-
days, because people don’t know anybody else. You are
in this business for life.” Now I turn to the role of com-
munications technologies in the UKUSA assemblage.
Technologies and Affordances
Understanding UKUSA requires knowing more
than the role of institutions and individuals in its
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emergence. Communications technologies not only
compose the tendons connecting the participating
intelligence services but also form the objects of
UKUSA surveillance. Therefore, UKUSA has always
incorporated communications technologies used by
governments (and later, civilians) throughout the
world.
As early as January 1944, GC&CS was discussing
the creation of the BRUSA circuit, a radio connection
among Washington, Pearl Harbor, Melbourne,
Colombo, and London created by linking together
existing U.S. and UK radio systems (U.S.–British R.I.
1944a). On its completion later that year, “crypto-
channel 34” of the BRUSA circuit was kept free for
the exchange of Japanese intercepts (U.S.–British R.I.
1944b). Of course, with any transmission there is the
chance of interception, and so the Combined Cipher
Machine (CCM) was deployed throughout the circuit.
Encryption machines such as this converted messages
into code and also reverted them to their original
texts. As the name implies, the CCM was based on an
adaptor enabling the British Typex machine and the
U.S. ECMMark II machine to be interoperable.
It was widely recognized in 1946 that the secure
links between Washington and London were insuffi-
cient to enable a full integration of effort (Technical
Conference 1946). Appendix H in 1946 explicitly
stipulated that new circuits be added (and old World
War II circuits be channelized to increase their capac-
ity) to better connect the capitals. By 1953, Appendix
H added that “lateral communications between sta-
tions of one party and Agencies or stations of the oth-
er” may also be provided (Appendix H, 1953, 1); we
can therefore see the increasing density and rhizomatic
nature of these relations as UKUSA evolved.
If the intensity of connection within UKUSA
increased over time, so did the intensity of surveillance
that linked UKUSA to its outside. The difference
between the intra-UKUSA connections and those
linking it to the object of UKUSA’s surveillance was
not in the quantitative number of the connections but
in their qualitative nature. In short, communications
within UKUSA contributed toward a smooth space of
flows, whereas topological connections with the out-
side were hierarchical.
The arrival of satellite communications in the
1960s changed the geography of spying. For many
years, UKUSA only required three satellite intercept
bases—in Cornwall, West Virginia, and Washington.
Now the density of world communications requires
more satellites than that and more listening stations.
In the mid-2000s the NSA had ten or eleven operating
in satellite download footprints (Keefe 2006). Further,
microwave radio communications (e.g., mobile
phones) require yet another geography of listening sta-
tions; recent revelations point to UKUSA embassies
in foreign capitals as highly sophisticated eavesdrop-
pers reliant on their immediate proximity to the for-
eign policy apparatuses of their hosts (Campbell et al.
2013).
The cutting edge of surveillance today lies in fiber
optic cables. This form is a challenge because unlike
radio, microwave, or satellite signals, if light signals
are intercepted, the signal is degraded and therefore
tampering is revealed. Nevertheless, UKUSA has
incorporated technology affording it the capability to
tap fiber optics. Just as earlier forms of UKUSA relied
on the topology of the telegraph network (e.g., the
United Kingdom’s role as a jumping-off point for
undersea cables), a current program called STORM-
BREW relies on U.S. centrality in the global telecom-
munications network, with seven chokepoints where
cables intersect the U.S. borders. In contrast to such
“upstream” collection, UKUSA agencies also collect
data “downstream”: PRISM entails receiving data from
Internet corporations through overt or covert means.
The NSA has been known to physically intercept the
delivery of servers to private companies, open them
up, implant a “back door,” and then reseal them and
continue delivery (Greenwald 2014).
Another point of similarity with past UKUSA
efforts is that defeating encryption remains, as in
World War II, crucial. “PROJECT BULLRUN [is] a
joint effort between the NSA and [. . . GCHQ] to
defeat the most common forms of encryption used to
safeguard online transactions,” while
“EGOTISTICAL GIRAFFE . . . targets the Tor
browser that is meant to enable anonymity in online
browsing” (Greenwald 2014, 94). Other possibilities
exist for SIGINT collection that precedes the moment
of encryption. For instance, the NSA conducts
“Computer Network Exploitation” or putting malware
called “Quantum Insertion” onto specific computers
when the NSA wants to observe “every keystroke
entered and every screen viewed” (Greenwald 2014,
117). Therefore, private servers of companies such as
Yahoo! and Google and private computers of the more
than 50,000 recipients of Quantum Insertion have all
been enrolled in UKUSA. If the importance of both
topology and decryption to UKUSA has remained
constant, one thing has not: the intensity of communi-
cation flows.
612 Dittmer
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 04
:34
 19
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
5 
Criticism after 11 September 2001 of the intelli-
gence apparatus provided impetus for new technolo-
gies to organize this vast flow of intercepts for rapid
operationalization. XKEYSCORE is software that
examines e-mails and metadata stored on more
than 700 servers in 150 cities and seemingly repla-
ces an earlier keyword search program that
achieved some notoriety: ECHELON (Hager 1996).
BOUNDLESSINFORMANT is a program visualiz-
ing NSA metadata collection in real time. Such
programs attempt to operationalize the sheer vol-
ume of data collected through these UKUSA pro-
grams. “As of mid-2012, the [NSA] was processing
more than twenty billion communications events
(both Internet and telephone) from around the
world each day” (Greenwald 2014, 98). Beyond
visualization, another problem is the actual materi-
alization of all these data. In late 2013 the NSA
completed a new $1.5 billion data center near
Bluffdale, Utah, in hopes of holding all the intelli-
gence it sweeps up a bit longer before being com-
pelled to delete it for a lack of space (Hill 2013).
The increasing role of the private sector in consti-
tuting UKUSA is one of its most important evolutions
in the last fifteen years. In addition to the aforemen-
tioned collaborative relationships and coercive coop-
tations, a whole range of contractors have become
suppliers of technology and even intelligence itself
(Crampton, Roberts, and Poorthuis 2014).
[T]he growing importance of Open Source Intelligence
(OSINT) has given rise to the flourishing of private sec-
tor and non-state actor intelligence enterprises. Initially
focused on business intelligence, companies have moved
into mainstream security to meet the capacity problems
that emerged after 9/11. (Svendsen 2008, 139)
The rise of private interests in UKUSA points to
the distributed nature of its agency, as corporate inter-
ests become enrolled in its direction.
Companies like Booz Allen Hamilton and AT&T
employ hordes of former top government officials, while
hordes of current top defense officials are past (and likely
future) employees of those same corporations. Con-
stantly growing the surveillance state is a way to ensure
that the government funds keep flowing, that the revolv-
ing door stays greased. (Greenwald 2014, 168)
This account of UKUSA, drawing as it does on
recent journalistic sources, tends to overemphasize
those sources’ view of the UKUSA agencies as a loom-
ing, all-powerful eye, dominating the private-sector
companies through which it occasionally operates and
the individuals whose privacy it violates. The Bluff-
dale NSA data facility and the crucial niche occupied
by the private sector in intelligence, however, hint at
the ways in which the ability of NSA and GCHQ
leaders to direct the assemblage is highly contingent.
Rather, these agencies can equally be understood to
have the tiger by the tail, constantly buffeted by the
material affects circulating through the wider assem-
blage. These include the firehose of data that must be
assimilated, analyzed, and operated; the range of pri-
vate-sector interests that must be accommodated; and
the need to maintain capability with regard to new
communications technologies (like Tor) coming
online. Even periodic gaps in coverage (e.g., the initial
inability to view Skype calls) or analysis (a 2000 crash
of NSA computers that left GCHQ solely in charge of
analysis for three days) hint at the inherent fragility of
the UKUSA assemblage.
Further, these attempts to sweep up, store, and cir-
culate SIGINT have been hampered by the striated
spaces of security that UKUSA enacts. The tight rela-
tionship between the NSA and GCHQ is not neces-
sarily matched by the CIA and MI-6, complicating
intelligence sharing between the SIGINT and human
intelligence (HUMINT) sides of the special relation-
ship. One CIA senior official described an odd
moment during the Falklands War: “GCHQ seems to
share everything they get from the NSA with the SIS
[Special Intelligence Service, aka MI-6], and we [the
CIA] would give the NSA something that is
NOFORN [not for foreign distribution] and they
would say we can’t do that—our system is not set up
that way.” This is still true today; as one retired MI-6
official told me, “The NSA–GCHQ infrastructure is
sui generis. Logically on the broader intelligence front
there wouldn’t be interlinked computer systems.” The
actualization of UKUSA over time has coded space in
ways that foreclose some courses of action.
If there is (in theory if not always in practice) unre-
stricted exchange of SIGINT among the five UKUSA
states, there is also a further web of intelligence rela-
tionships—bilateral or otherwise—that need accom-
modation. For instance, NATO also has a policy of
intelligence sharing. Recent disclosures have also
revealed privileged intelligence relationships with
individual partners, such as Sweden (NSA intelligence
relationship 2013). Therefore, UKUSA is the dense
inner circle of a wider web of intelligence
relationships:
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[T]he UK and US intelligence communities contribute
towards the greater globalization of intelligence. . . . Nota-
bly, officials seek to accomplish this gradually, within
UK–US terms or “rules of engagement.” These condi-
tional movements help establish UK and US-led “best
practices” and frameworks. (Svendsen 2010, xx)
UKUSA works as an engine of intelligence harmoni-
zation, serving as the nucleus of a web of material flows
binding together a wide range of intelligence services
in a hierarchical fashion.
If the previous section focused on the role of affec-
tive relations between individual bodies in the produc-
tion of the UKUSA assemblage, this section has
shown the role of a range of technologies in mediating
those affects and enabling the agency of UKUSA to
emerge. These circulating materialities—nowadays
almost entirely in digital form—carry with them an
affective push that shapes the political cognition of
those they encounter (albeit in highly differentiated
ways). In the next section I turn to the affective
impact of UKUSA on the second-order bodies politic
that compose it.
Reworking State Assemblages and Affecting
Foreign Policy
It is crucial to understand that UKUSA is not sim-
ply an agreement between governments. The agree-
ment formalized processes of mangling already
underway. The intelligence services of both countries,
even before the war was over, were making integrated
personnel decisions. For instance, when a shortage in
Japanese translators was found in Op-20-G (U.S. naval
intelligence) one month before V-J Day, it was
decided that “[t]he British should be persuaded not to
reduce their scale of effort until the Japanese emer-
gency is over, as they provide a reserve of skilled and
experienced personnel” (Snyder 1945, 3). Ad hoc col-
lective decision making thus existed prior to the agree-
ment. Still, the agreement rippled through the
intelligence communities of all five participants.
Entering into UKUSA reshaped the actualized form of
each intelligence community. Power was not only
exercised by these organizations but through them, a
transformational process.
The U.S. intelligence community was fundamen-
tally reshaped by cooperation prior to the 1946 agree-
ment. During the war, the U.S. SIGINT assemblage
was at best loosely territorialized, being fragmented
between the Army (Arlington Hall) and the Navy
(Op-20-G). As Aid (2009, 3) put it, “Though the two
cryptanalytic organizations shared code-breaking
responsibilities, cooperation was the exception rather
than the rule.” This was a direct contrast with the
highly centralized British SIGINT effort.
This fragmentation proved troublesome to the war
effort, diminishing effectiveness with friends as well as
enemies. Arlington Hall was much more enmeshed
with British intelligence than Op-20-G was. This
allowed the British to play one against the other. For
instance, when Op-20-G refused to give intelligence
to the British but shared it with Arlington Hall, the
British would just ask Arlington Hall for it. Toward
the end of the war the U.S. Navy briefly suspended its
intelligence sharing with the U.S. Army for exactly
this reason (Wenger 1945b). To prepare for the
UKUSA negotiations, it was decided to present a com-
mon front, and this required a common decision-mak-
ing body. Thus was created the State-Army-Navy
Communications Intelligence Board. This organiza-
tion was the organizational equivalent of the London
Signals Intelligence Board (LSIB), which claimed to
speak for the British intelligence community through-
out the Empire. By 1953, despite resistance from the
armed forces, U.S. SIGINT was centralized in the
NSA, which mirrored GCHQ. Having established the
role of UKUSA in both reterritorializing the U.S.
intelligence assemblage and producing new smooth
(between U.S. and UK agencies) and striated (hierar-
chies of centralization) spaces, I now turn to the role
of UKUSA in changing the intelligence communities
of the British Empire.
UKUSA’s effect on the British Empire can be
understood as the inverse of the U.S. experience of
centralization. First, it had the long-term effect of ter-
ritorializing the dominions (Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand) with regard to intelligence matters. Sec-
ond, it harmonized the intelligence apparatus of each
dominion with that of the United Kingdom.
With regard to the first point, recall that one of the
assets the United Kingdom brought to the agreement
was its substantial presence in areas where the United
States had little. To make this claim, GCHQ relied on
their ability to speak on behalf of the dominions;
indeed, the draft agreement in late 1945 (Enclosure A
1945) made this claim despite the fact that no domin-
ion intelligence agency recognized the supremacy of
the LSIB. The confusing constitutional arrangements
among the dominions made for a topological puzzle:
Were they inside the agreement, on account of their
being part of the Empire, or were they outside them on
614 Dittmer
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 04
:34
 19
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
5 
account of their independence? The Americans were
in favor of these countries falling under LSIB, as they
wanted a single point of contact. Indeed, wartime
intelligence collaboration with the dominions had
been problematic (Draft British–U.S. 1945). For their
part, the LSIB “felt it should have a preferred position
as regards the dominions and desires to exercise the
right of approval regarding United States contacts
with dominion agencies.” The U.S. Navy insisted that
the explicit approval of the dominions be given. To
satisfy them, the British took the representatives of
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand aside during a
Commonwealth conference, explained the parts of the
UKUSA agreement that would apply to them, and
gained their agreement (Minutes of inauguration
meeting 1946). The topological muddle was main-
tained in the final agreement: “While the Dominions
are not parties to this Agreement they will not be
regarded as third parties.” Despite this initial fudging
of the status of the dominions, by 1953 all of these
states would take up a fully independent role in
UKUSA.
Nevertheless, there were fundamental asymme-
tries between the dominions and the main partners.
This, and the topological relation between the
United Kingdom and the dominions, was perhaps
best materialized in the Australia–New Zealand
Integrated Communication Intelligence Center in
Melbourne, which despite its name was run by the
British. Where the United States and United King-
dom both had global ambitions, the three domin-
ions not only had skeletal SIGINT operations but
were woeful in their security. One of the delays in
Australia’s full admission to UKUSA was the dis-
covery of KGB and GRU spies within the intelli-
gence establishment (Keefe 2006; Aid 2009). Only
after Australia was convinced to set up a counterin-
telligence outfit parallel to MI-5 were they allowed
to fully participate (Aldrich 2010).
Beyond security procedures, the dominions needed
to restructure their previous, ad hoc intelligence appa-
ratus into something resembling the institutional
model emerging in UKUSA. As a Canadian document
attests,
In general the tendency is toward greater control by the
Foreign Office and the State Department. . . . In plan-
ning the structure we might draw from the experience of
both countries though our governmental system is some-
what different than both and so that we cannot trans-
plant the whole from either. (Memorandum on post-war
plans 1945, 1)
Indeed, Canada ended up consolidating its wartime
intelligence efforts into a single organization—the
Communications Branch of the National Research
Council. Similarly, Australia set up a British-inspired
Joint Intelligence Committee and “most importantly,
a unitary Signals Intelligence Centre along the lines of
GCHQ, which was given the cover name Defence Sig-
nals Branch” (Aldrich 2010, 93). The institution was
British in form, as twenty of its officers were seconded
from GCHQ, including its first director (Andrew
1989).
From the preceding it can be seen that UKUSA
acted back on the participating countries’ intelligence
agencies. As Aldrich (2010, 278) noted, UKUSA is
more than just a tool for the enactment of foreign pol-
icy. UKUSA became an end unto itself:
At remote locations such as the Chagos Islands in the
Indian Ocean or Ascension Island in the Atlantic, the
future of entire territories was shaped by the need for
Anglo-American listening stations. Intelligence had
once merely served the “special relationship,” but now
secretive intelligence and defence projects lay at its very
centre.
If foreign policy came to revolve increasingly around
maintaining joint intelligence capabilities, what of the
affective power of intelligence cooperation to produce
other common policies?
Dumbrell (2006, 461) argued that UKUSA cooper-
ation contributes to the “inclining logic” of the special
relationship, predisposing policymakers to similar atti-
tudes and predispositions. More specifically, Lander
(2004, 487) noted that “the UK Weekly Survey of
Intelligence and the Presidential Intelligence Brief
probably look very similar most weeks and that tends
to reinforce the closeness of the world view of the two
governments.” This long-term bureaucratic intimacy
means that producing distance when desired is a chal-
lenge; Dumbrell (2006, 461) noted that it was
“practically impossible to disentangle U.S.–U.K. shar-
ing of military intelligence regarding Argentina” dur-
ing the Falklands War, although he also cited the
VietnamWar as proof that policy outcomes do not fol-
low from common intelligence (the United Kingdom
never joined the United States in that war). Indeed,
Aldrich (2004) noted that almost all Western intelli-
gence services believed that Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction in 2003, and yet there were wildly diver-
gent responses.
The assemblage approach does not attribute emer-
gent effects to the materialized intelligence itself,
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however, but sees them as a product of the way the
various parts of the assemblage come together. The
integrated processes of intelligence produce embodied
predispositions that color how common intelligence is
interpreted or acted on. Additionally, UKUSA is
enmeshed with other forms of everyday diplomacy,
such as military and foreign policy cooperation. A
senior UK intelligence official argued that UK partici-
pation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq resulted from the
enmeshing of the two countries’ executive branches:
Having committed himself [Blair] morally, . . . the rail-
way timetables of war meant that most of the British
Army was in the process of being deployed to the Gulf
before any [Parliamentary] decision was actually taken
that the UK was going to participate, because they
couldn’t afford to wait. . . . Having had our military plan-
ners integrated with U.S. military planners, we were an
integral part of the U.S. military plan. . . . So are we
going to say, “Sorry, we are not coming?” This would
have been unthinkable.
Intelligence cooperation is here only one part of the
story and one insufficient on its own to account for the
United Kingdom’s intervention in Iraq. But the pre-
emptive logic of intelligence, combined with the affec-
tive world of everyday diplomacy, feeds into an
emergent causation that both explains the invasion of
Iraq and also holds out the possibility of alternative
lines of flight, as seen in the 2013 Parliamentary vote
on action in Syria.
These geopolitical events could not be foreseen in
their specificity; however, Major General Sir Stewart
Menzies, chair of the 1946 Technical Conference,
noted that UKUSA was crucial “both in ensuring
cooperation in the SIGINT field and in its effect on
cementing the relations between the two countries
generally” (Minutes of inauguration meeting 1946, 1).
Menzies’s vision has been borne out over time; one
senior UK official said that the UKUSA infrastructure
is “right at the center of the U.S.–UK relationship. It
is the connection between the two and the reason for
the special relationship.” As Kuus (2013) noted, the
political often masquerades as the technical. I now
turn to some concluding thoughts.
Conclusions
This article has traced the emergence of UKUSA
with as much empirical specificity as can be mustered
on such a secretive topic. Credit must go to the many
scholars of intelligence cooperation who have
documented many of the “black box” empirical details
on which this article’s argument relies. It is hoped that
the findings of this article will stimulate a discussion in
that field about the role of theory and the starting
assumptions of intelligence-related scholarship. The
disembodied, institutionalist, and rationalist assump-
tions of much of this literature threaten to perpetuate
the disconnection of intelligence studies from wider
scholarship. This article, it is hoped, goes some way to
answer Gaddis’s (1989, 212) “So what?” regarding the
historical detail of intelligence studies by connecting
intelligence cooperation to wider processes of everyday
diplomacy that have produced transnational geopoliti-
cal assemblages.
This attention to historical detail is necessary
because UKUSA could be seen as the poster child for
the Anglosphere, and if the next-nearest circle of con-
fidants is included (Germany, Sweden, etc.), then
intelligence sharing seems to point to the West. What
this historical account of UKUSA indicates is the
highly contingent evolution of the partnership, which
could easily have been other than what it is and
indeed is constantly morphing into something differ-
ent. Only by setting governmental intent alongside
the agency of technologies, private companies, and
even whistleblowers like Edward Snowden can the
baroque workings of power be seen.
UKUSA is an emergent system originally impro-
vised from common opposition to Nazi Germany and
an array of in-the-field collaborations between U.S.
and UK military personnel. The affective relations of
trust produced in the war between specific individuals
in each country’s intelligence community, when juxta-
posed with the uncertain future of atomic weapons in
a new world order, enabled a new kind of body politic
to emerge: UKUSA. This was not a given, and there
are numerous lines of flight that are equally real, if not
actualized. Nevertheless, UKUSA was institutionalized
as a set of common procedures that harmonized states
in the realm of intelligence. The flows of standard-for-
mat intelligence, the sharing of embodied routines,
the harmonized jargon, the use of common computer
technologies, the affective bonds with liaison offi-
cers—these are everyday forms of diplomacy that have
thus far escaped our attention, despite their collective
agency that can be seen acting through foreign policy
apparatuses and shaping foreign policy decisions.
Because international relations theory has too often
emphasized the rationality of state elites, such embod-
ied affects have been rendered invisible, despite their
evident effects. It is for this reason that I have
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described affect as the poltergeist of international
affairs, rearranging the room when nobody is looking
(or willing to see). Attempts to explain away the ghost
in the system via civilizational thinking take the
microscaled complexity of overlapping harmonized
practices, material flows, and affective relations, in
which individual first- and second-order bodies politic
are multiply enmeshed, and reduces them to a crude
macroscaled singularity—culture. Therefore, further
study of this topic is crucial—not only for working out
the empirical details of the innumerable everyday
diplomacies yet to be investigated but also because
such empirical work is needed as part of a political
project that undercuts simplistic and reductionist
accounts of geopolitics and replaces them with better
ones. The literature in critical geopolitics has been
consistently excellent in deconstructing civilizational
discourses (e.g., Bassin 2007) but rather less excellent
in offering a constructive account for what appears
commonsensical to many observers. This article has
attempted to do just that.
There are everyday diplomacies beyond intelli-
gence collaboration, such as equipment standardiza-
tion and interoperability in NATO (and beyond)
and international arrest warrants (and subsequent
extradition of bodies). These everyday diplomacies
not only enact the states in whose name they are
done, but they also produce uneven geographies of
affective intensity and flow. These uneven geogra-
phies enable systems to self-organize over time,
becoming anew and enacting a collective agency
that shapes the cognitive sense-making of the bod-
ies politic enrolled in them. A whole world of
everyday diplomacies awaits careful examination.
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